The Derveni Papyrus column VII, verses 9-11. Comments on the reconstruction, translation and interpretation.

The discovery in 1962 of papyrus scrolls in Derveni, a small settlement near Thessaloniki, with its commentary attributed to Orpheus’ poem containing a cosmological-teogonical myth and the commentator’s quotes from the poem, was the start of a great academic dispute among many researchers and research centres of Ancient Greece. The initial reconstruction of fragments of the papyrus were first published in 1982 (Anon, “Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik” p.47, 1982). Since then academic research has continued to try to solve the ‘Derveni puzzles’ and reconstruct the missing fragments. The debate over the author of the commentary also continues or at least an attempt has been made to discover the intellectual background the according to which the commentary can be interpreted. The predominant view links the papyrus with Orphism. There is no doubt that the Derveni papyrus together with the “gold leaf/plates” and tablets from Olbia strongly supports the fact that Orphism was not only an intellectual trend difficult to define unambiguously but was also an organised philosophical-religious movement (although it is still very difficult to say anything definite about the extent and structure of this organisation). It is not the purpose of this paper to consider the question of Orphism or the validity of acknowledging it as an organised religious movement with its own forms of worship (cult). It does, however, intend to consider a number of issues taken up the commentator of the Derveni papyrus from the point of view of intellectual history.

Even a cursory glance at the commentator’s text reveals, on the one hand, a wealth of subjects (cosmogony, theogony, paideia, law, political power); on the other hand, the interrelationships between these subjects are difficult to separate. How then does one do an exegesis of the text? I would submit that the inseparability of the individual elements may be advantageous in that it allows the reader complete freedom when deciding where to start his commentary. He can concentrate on any one issue and sooner or later all of the aforementioned subjects will arise to a greater or lesser degree. As a historian of political
thought, it seems natural for me to start from verses 9 to 11 in column VII, which at first glance bring to mind issues concerned with politics and the law.

However, before attempting to interpret the selected fragment, it is essential to analyse the variants of the reconstruction and translation and also to indicate the context in which the given fragment appears in the text of the papyrus.

Let us start with an analysis of the text. Consideration needs to be given not only to various possible reconstructions but also to the possibility of various translations. I will begin with a short presentation of a book edited in Oxford in 1997 by André Laks and Glenn Most entitled *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*. Laks and Most’s translation of the 1982 version of the text is to be found on pages 10-22. The authors took into consideration Kyriakos Tsanstanoglou’s commentary and translations (I will refer to his article *The First Columns of the Derveni Papyrus and their Religious Significance*, on pages 93-128 of the above mentioned book, because of its reconstruction of the first seven columns), as well as translations and reconstructions by Luc Brisson (column XII), Dirk Obbink (columns XX, XXII) Werner Burkert (Column XXV) and two unpublished English translations (R. Lamberton and D. Obbink) and a French one (J. Bollack).


In 2004, Gabor Betegh dedicated an extensive monograph to the Derveni papyrus (*The Derveni Papyrus. Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation*, Cambridge, 2004). There is a reconstruction of the text and an English translation on pages 4-55.
In 2006, after extensive research, Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parássoglou and Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou published *The Derveni Papyrus*, with a newly reconstructed text (p 62-125), a translation (129-139), and commentary.

At the same time, Italian researcher Franco Ferrari was working on the reconstruction of the text, which resulted in the publication of his article in 2007 devoted to columns II to VII (F. Ferrari, *Note al testo della colonne II – VII del Papiro di Derveni*, ZPE, 162, 2007, p 203-210).

The article published by Kouremenos, Parássoglou and Tsantsanoglou leads to a very interesting controversy in the *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* between the authors and Richard Janko (Janko’s text of 29.10.2006, a response by Kouremenos, Parássoglou and Tsantsanoglou of 02.11.2006 and then Janko’s response of 20.11.2006).


In the not too distant future, we should expect the unceasing editorial work to result in further discoveries and new variants.
Let us now consider the various reconstructions of column VII verses 9-11. To be more precise, the analysis will not include the whole of verse 9 but only the fragment beginning θύρας. Let us examine the five verses:

   
   [...θ]ύρας γάρ ἐπιθέ[σθαι κελ]εύσας το[ίς]

   [...q]u/raj ga<r>e)piqe<sqai kel]eусας τοί[ς]

   τή]<nu ἀκοήν [άγνεύο]ντας κατ[ά]:


   [.....θ]ύρας” γάρ „ἐπιθέ[σθαι” κελ]εύσας το[ίς]

   [...q]u/raj ga<r>e)piqe<sqai kel]eусας τοί[ς]

   ἀλλα διδάσκειν τούς τή]<nu ἀκοήν [άγνευο]ντας, κατ[ά]:


   [...θ]ύρας γάρ ἐπιθέ[σθαι κελ]εύσας το[ίς]

   [...q]u/raj ga<r>e)piqe<sqai kel]eусας τοί[ς]

   τούς τή]<nu ἀκοήν [άγνευο]ντας κατ[ά]:


   [.....θ]ύρας” γάρ „ἐπιθέ[σθαι” κελ]εύσας το[ίς]

   [,.q]u/raj ga<r>e)piqe<sqai kel]eусας τοί[ς]

   τή]<nu ἀκοήν [άγνευο]ντας κατ[ά]:

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1 A simplified notation method has been used to write down fragments from the papyrus: square brackets are used for those parts of the text where the letters cannot be identified. I have not used dots below letters which can only partly be identified or are uncertain. For a more complete picture of the text, I have indicated which editions should be consulted for that particular section.
The examples cited above vary in several respects. Let us start from two seemingly trivial details: the notation \textit{ôútpi} and the use of quotation marks, suggests that it is a quote from the anonymous author’s commentary of a poem supposedly written by Orpheus. The notation \textit{ôútpi} (\textit{oú tì}) appears to be of little significance. Both versions retain the basic meaning but the choice of one rather than the other may lead to subtle differences in the translation (this will be examined in more detail later). Also, the use of quotation marks makes little difference to the meaning of the analysed fragment. However, it is important to establish what may constitute a quote in the fragment and what is paraphrased. Let us examine this in more detail.\(^2\)

The construction \textit{θύρας ἐπίθεσθε} was first identified by Walter Burket as part of the formula, which leads into the cosmogonic-theogonic poem attributed to Orpheus. Martin L. West agrees with Burkett’s suggestion and in his hypothetical reconstruction of the poem in the Derveni papyrus makes the following addition:

\[ \text{[΄ Αείσῶ ξυνετοίσι ---] θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι--- .} \]

This formulation was reconstructed on the basis of several ancient accounts. The oldest is a fragment from Plato’s \textit{Symposium} (218b) in which the following sentence is spoken Alcibiades:

\textit{Oi (de ὦ ὀικέται, καὶ εἴτε ἄλλος ἐστι βέβηλός τε καὶ ἀγροικος, πῦλας πάνυ μεγάλας τοῖς ὦσιν ἐπίθυμεσθε.} \(^4\)


\(^4\) This sentence is preceded by a fragment which introduces a Bacchic aspect and therefore Otto Kern has incorporated it in its entirety in Orphicorum fragments, 13: πάντες γάρ κεκοιμώνηκατε τῆς
Tsantsanoglou claims that “the first half of the verse, which Plato omits, appears in two versions in later authors. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Comp*.25.5, and Aristides, *Or*.3.50, allude to the version:

φγέγξομαι οίς θεμίς ἐστι

The same version can be found in the Jewish Διαφθηκατ where all three variants (Redactio Justiniana, Clementina, Aristbuliana) start with the following formula:

φθέγξομαι οίς θεμίς ἐστι, θύρας δ’ ἐπίθεσθε βεβηλοί.

West has taken the first phrase – ἀείσω ξυνετοίς – from Plutarch who claims the following in *Quaestiones convivales*, 636d 8-9:

ἀείσω ξυνετοίς τὸν Ὄρφικον καὶ ἱερὸν λόγον.

Tsantsanoglou then points to fragment B 3 by Empedocles, as the one in which the philosopher from Akragas imitates the form used by Orpheus, which is closer to the version used by Dionysus of Halicarnassus and Aristides than to Plutarch’s version.

παρθένε Μοῦσα,

ἀντομαι, ὅν θεμίς ἐστίν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,

πέμπε.

It would seem that West’s proposition is well founded since the use of the quote in the analysed fragment of column VII is justified. However, several problems still remain

φιλοσόφου μανίς τε καὶ βασιχείας: διὸ πάντες ἡ κούσεθε: συγγνώσεθε γὰρ τοῖς τοῦτο πραχθέσαι καὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγόμενοι. As Tsantsanoglou claims: “The terms he employs metaphorically are all borrowed from the language of mystic ritual: κεκοινωνήσατε; μανίς and βασιχεία speak for themselves; πραχθέντα and λεγόμενα allude to the well-known distinction between δρόμηνα and λεγόμενα in the mysteries”, Tsantsanoglou, *The First Columns*... p. 125–126.

5 Tsantsanoglou, *The First Columns*, p. 125. With regard to Dionysus, it would seem that a contracted word has crept in: namely De compositione verborum 25, 25–27. As far as Aelius Aristides, is concerned the said fragment comes from a speech by Πρὸς Πλάτωνα ύπὲρ τῶν τετάρτων, jebb page 129, line 6–8.


8 Ibid.
Firstly, West’s reconstruction suggests a closing of the door by the ‘profane’ (those who are uninitiated in the Orphic rituals) in that they leave the premises and close the gates, behind which only the initiated will hear Orpheus’ singing. In other words, West’s reconstruction treats the closing of the doors literally (as can be seen in the verse from Εἰς τὸ θείου). Plato’s (as well as Dionysus’ and Aristides’) versions primarily suggest that the closing of the doors is figurative but the exclusion of the uninitiated from the ‘lesson’ remains unchanged. The version presented in the Derveni papyrus also seems to treat the issue figuratively and refers to the closing the doors of the ears of the uninitiated. What then does the quote mean?

There are many difficulties associated with the answer to this question. It is important to stress that, in the papyrus text, the quote does not have quotation marks around it. Therefore, its reconstruction will probably forever remain merely hypothetical. Richard Janko was the first to suggest the use of quotation marks in editions of the text (see Janko1). He put the phrase “Θύρας ἐπιθέσθαι” into quotation marks (I have omitted the square brackets which indicate reconstruction).

In the Tsantsanoglou-Parassoglu edition, the phrase “Θύρας ἐπιθέσθαι ὡσιν” is in quotation marks. However, in his later work, Janko has not changed the place of the quotation marks but he has changed the infinitive form (ininitivus praesentis mediī/passive) ἐπιθέσθαι to the imperative form (imperativus praesentis mediī/passive) ἐπιθέσθε arguing that “the new joins confirm the previous editors’ supplements, save the Orpheus’ poem is quoted in direct speech rather than oratio oblique, i.e. Θύρας ἐπιθέσθε rather than Θύρας ἐπιθέσθαι”9. This seems to be a strong argument, as the use of the infinitive does in fact sound strange. It also fits well with the form used by Plato or Διονύσιος. However, even though Aristides and Dionysus use the infinitive,10 it seems that they are not

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9 R. Janko, Reconstructing (again) the Opening of the Derveni Papyrus, ZPE, 166, 2008, p. 39.
quotes but simply paraphrases. Using this logic, the quote could be left by changing the infinitive to the imperative. We are more likely to regard the phrase θύρας ἐπιθέσθαι as a paraphrase than a quote, if the infinitive form is maintained. This would mean consistently getting rid of the quotation marks. However, the Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou edition not only keeps the infinitive but also the quotation marks and goes even further to include ὡσὶν. This immediately begs the question: why is the article τοῖς excluded from the quote? Let us bear in mind that the fragment quoted from Symposium fits in here perfectly: πύλας τοῖς ὡσὶν ἐπίθεσθε, simply by changing the word order and replacing πύλας with θύρας.

It seems very likely that if we are dealing with a quote, it should also include τοῖς ὡσὶν. It is obvious that in the language of what is a stylized poem attributed to Orpheus, it was possible to omit the article (however - θύρας ἔπιθεσθε). This would mean that the commentator simply added the article to the original version. An additional argument which could support the omission of the article is the metric composition of the formula in accordance with the principles of dactylic hexameter. Since we can only assume the beginning of the verse, let us agree that it starts either from φθέγξομαι σίς θέμις ἐστι, or ἀείσῳ ξυνετοίσι.

If so, θύ - is the second short syllable of the third dactylic foot. This means that there are now two possibilities: 1. we accept the form ἐπιθέσθαι and the verse cannot be completed either by the use of ὡσὶν (insufficient syllable) or τοῖς ὡσὶν (incorrect order of morae) but by e.g. βέβηλοι; 2. we accept the form ἐπιθέσθαι (where the final diphthong is treated as a long syllable) and then we can use ὡσὶν, but most definitely without the article (there are too many morae with the article); if, however, the final diphthong in ἐπιθέσθαι is treated as a short syllable, then the situation is similar to the one where the imperative form is used. It is also possible to view the whole fragment as a
At this point, we need to consider if the fragment can be read in the context of the remaining pieces of the papyrus. This is extremely difficult since no one but Greek researchers can work on the original. We need to stress that Richard Janko also works on photographs found in the 2006 edition. Based on the materials the Greek researchers have allowed him to work on, Janko suggests a somewhat different construction of the puzzles (these are the “new joins” referred to in the quote cited above). Instead of fragment F 3a, he includes two others: I 7 and I 55 (I am aware of the fact that this discussion can only be understood by those who have the 2006 edition with all the fragments of the papyrus but this cannot be explained in any other way.) Janko’s corrections of the Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou edition are based on these parts. If, in fact, his suggestion to include the above mentioned fragments is correct, and if the letters he says exist were to be found, then the question of the quote could be regarded as being partially solved (if the imperative form is used, then the formula θύρας επίθεσθε cannot be understood other than that as a quote). However, are Janko’s arguments irrefutable? I will not attempt to definitively answer the question. I have neither the experience nor equipment to begin a debate with such an experienced papyrus researcher as Janko (either to confirm or refute his argument). The only claim I can make from a brief examination of the fragment is that I 7 and I 55 might, I repeat might, fit fragment F 3a to the otherwise missing fragment.

Will I be able to find the letters that Janko used to supplement verses 9, 10 and 11 in I 7 and I 55 of the papyrus? Let us take a closer look.

Fragment I 55 should be placed on the right hand side, should be the width of about two letters and the height of about four verses. The one thing we can be sure of is that Σ really does seem to fit verse 10, just in front of ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ which has been preserved (this would be the final Σ in the article ΤΟΙΣ). This Σ is the only letter in this fragment, which has

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11 Th. Kouremenos, treats the matter somewhat incoherently following the version proposed by his colleagues namely Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou. He states that ‘Here the Derveni author probably paraphrases (a verse from) the beginning of the papyrus’, Th. Kouremenos, Commentary, in: The Derveni Papyrus. Edited
been identified in the *Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou* edition (c.f. p.124). In 1 55, Janko also identifies (or at least I think he does, as he does not explain in detail, which letters he identified in which fragment) Λ in verse 9 (from the word ΚΕΛΕΥΣΑΣ), I in verse 10 (from the article ΤΟΙΣ), O in verse 11 (from ΚΑΘΑΡΕΥΟΝΤΑΣ or from ΑΓΝΕΥΝΤΑΣ). Janko himself is uncertain of all these letters. Although this is beyond the confines of my analysis, it is worth adding that he also regards the letter O (from ΔΗΛΟΙ) as uncertain.

As far as fragment 1 7 is concerned, it is similar in size but located one verse higher and to the left of 1 55. On the basis of 1 7, Janko has partially reconstructed four verses: 6, 7, 8 and 9. If the suggested letters from verses 6-8 only confirm the earlier assumptions, then two letters from verse 9 may play a key role in the interesting problem of the supposed quote.

Janko identifies E as an uncertain letter, the final letter from the word ΕΠΙΘΕΣΘΕ, and immediately after this the certain letter O (which Janko identifies from the word ομικρόν, which is the subject here i.e. Orpheus himself). If his reconstruction is correct, then the issue is solved: the infinitive can no longer be kept and the imperative form must be accepted and so the quote should only include the formula θύρας ἐπιθεσθε, followed by τοῖς ωσίν.

To be absolutely clear, I repeat – I am not in a position to either refute or confirm Janko’s reconstruction (though it is undoubtedly both likely and attractive). I must leave this an open matter and consider both versions in my analysis i.e. the one by *Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou* and *Janko2*, and as far as the quote is concerned, to consider a third possibility; in that it is simply a paraphrase.

Another difference found in the above editions is the inclusion of the article τοῦς in verse 11 (the article for ἀγνεύοντας – Betegh), the inclusion of an extensive fragment – ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ διδάσκειν τοῦς (Janko1, Janko2), or non-inclusion of the additions (*Tsantsanoglou, Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou*).
The differences stated above appear to be significant but they are played down by relevant commentaries.

And so Gabor Betegh includes the formula “(? but only for)”\(^\text{12}\), in the relevant place in his translation, which in principle corresponds to the one accepted by Janko, in that “the law” for all is contrasted with the imparting of knowledge only to the initiated, that is, those who are ‘pure in hearing’.

The Greek researchers’ approach is even closer to Janko’s. In the frequently mentioned 1997 publication, Tsantsanoglou claims: ‘the change of the case from the dative (τοῖς πολλοῖς) to accusative (ἀγνευόντας) shows that a new verb was introduced in line 11: possibly διδάσκειν, or, more commensurate with the size of the gap, ἐκδιδάσκειν; e.g. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκδιδάσκειν τοὺς κτλ.’\(^\text{13}\). Kouremenos adopts the same view in his commentary to the 2006 edition without adding anything new but merely quotes Tsanstanoglou’s formulation as mentioned above\(^\text{14}\).

These differences are *de facto* superficial since all the authors generally agree on the way the fragment should be completed.

After these initial comments on the various editions, we can now proceed to the translation of the fragment, which interests us. Let us start by considering several English translations and the Polish translation. The English translations which follow accompany the above mentioned editions and are presented below:

1. „for by ordering them to put doors the their ears he says that he does not legislate for the multitude, but that he teaches those whose hearing is pure” (*Tsantsanoglou*, p. 98);

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\(^{13}\) Tsantsanoglou, *The First Columns...*, p. 128.

2. „for when he orders them to »shut the doors« on their ears, he is stating that he is not making laws for most people, but teaching only those who are pure of hearing” (Janko-1, p. 15);

3. „for having order them to put doors to their ears he says that he is [not legislating] for the many…[but only for] those pure in hearing” (Betegh, p. 17);

4. „for, having ordered them to »put doors to their ears«, he says that he is not legislating for the many [but addressing himself to those] who are pure in hearing” (Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou, p. 131);

5. „for the one who bids them »shut the doors« on their ears is saying that he is certainly not making laws for many, but instructing those who are pure in hearing” (Janko-2, p. 39);

6. „ordering them to »put doors on their ears«, he is saying that they must not legislate for the many but teach only those who are pure in hearing” (K. Kulig, Papirus z Derveni (translation), „Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne”, 3 [38] 2005, s. 8).

Janko’s translation (both versions) and Tsanstanoglou’s, apart from small differences in the different editions (the issue of the quote), are basically the same in meaning. Betegh’s translation and Tsantanoglou- Parassoglou’s appear incompatible with the comments above by Tsantsanoglou and Kouremenos. What word does (“addressing”), refer to given that column 11 has been reconstructed differently and this allows for two possibilities. They can be interpreted according to Janko and Tsanstanoglou’s translations which present the legislature / law –giving for the many instructing those who are pure of hearing. Another version is possible in which the difference only refers to those being addressed by Orpheus (in other words: ‘not to legislate for the many, but [legislate] only for those who are pure of hearing’). This gives rise to two questions: 1.in the light of the present reconstructions can we basically agree that the issue has been resolved as in the missing part of verse 11 the verb νομοθετεῖν appears? 2.how is the difference between νομοθετεῖν and διδάσκειν (ἐ)κδιδάσκειν to be understood? The second issue will be considered in my interpretation of the analysed fragment. However, let us begin with the first question. In Janko’s 2002 edition, he points out in his critical apparatus that verse 11 could be supplemented by ἀλλὰ μόνον πρὸς τοὺς τήν - as far as the number of letters and space

is concerned, it fits variant ἄλλα διδάσκειν τοὺς τὴν exactly. As far as the actual space available for reconstruction is concerned, ἄλλα μόνον πρὸς τοὺς τὴν seems to be a much better alternative to ἄλλα διδάσκειν τοὺς τὴν. As Tsantsanoglou mentions, the problem is caused by a change of case from dative to accusative, which can only be explained by the fact that a new verb has been introduced. Bearing in mind these two factors – the available space to be filled and the existence of grammatical forms - we must accept that a new verb appears in the missing fragment of verse11, in contrast with νομοθετεῖν in verse 10 (I can in no way explain why Tsantanglou-Parassoglou’s English version is the way it is, particularly since there is no commentary by the authors while Kouremenos’ commentary seems to contradict the translation. Should it be διδάσκειν or ἐκδιδάσκειν?

Tsantsanoglou suggests that the second form fits better than the first, given the size of the missing fragment. It is difficult to resolve the matter, as the space is somewhat too large to stipulate precisely the number of missing letters. It is worth noting that the space of the reconstructed fragment in verse11 to the left of α in ἀκοὴν more or less fits the space in verse 10 to the left of τ in νομοθετέω. The analysed fragment of verse 10 has exactly 20 letters (the same as in the versions by Tsantsanoglou, Janko-1, Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou and in Janko-2): ΩΣΙΝΑΥΤΟΥΣΟΥΤΙΝΟΜΟΘΕ. As far as the reconstruction of verse 11 is concerned, both versions edited by Janko (Janko-1, Janko-2) contain 20 letters: ΑΛΛΑΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝΟΤΩΣΘΗΝ. If we accept Tsanstanoglou’s suggestion (namely: ΑΛΛΕΚΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝΟΤΣΘΗΝ) then 21 letters would have to fit into the reconstructed fragment. There would not be a problem with this but for the fact that Janko’s version also fits the free space. Since there is no change in the meaning, the controversy over whether the missing fragment should be διδάσκειν or ἐκδιδάσκειν is unimportant and inconclusive. There is a similar problem with the reconstruction of the word for “pure” of hearing. The Janko-2 version suggests replacing ἀγνεύοντας with καθαρεύοντας arguing that ‘my text includes one minor change that the spacing requires’.

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16 Janko, Reconstructing (again) the Opening., p. 39.
simulating the required number of letters is more credible. The present reconstruction consists of six letters (ΑΓΝΕΥΟ) whereas the new one has eight (ΚΑΘΑΠΕΥΟ). Based on photographs of the papyrus, the six-letter reconstruction appears rather short to fill in the spacing whereas the eight-letter one fits rather better.

A far greater problem exists when the English translations are confronted with the Polish one. It concerns discovering what the subject of both νομοθετεῖν and διδάσκειν is. All the English versions state that the subject is “he” i.e. Orpheus. In the Polish version, the subject refers to those whom Orpheus is speaking to (presumably the initiated). It is impossible to exaggerate the consequences of this difference. Is Orpheus saying that he himself does not legislate for the many / give the law to the many but teaches only those who are pure of hearing, or is Orpheus speaking to the initiated (= the pure of hearing?), so that they do not legislate but teach those who are pure of hearing.

This is indeed a matter of great importance. If we assume that Orpheus is only speaking about what he himself does or does not do, then we cannot conclude from this, that the initiated cannot legislate. If, on the other hand, he is instructing the initiated as to what they can or cannot do, then this can be seen as forbidding the initiated to legislate and consequently, this seems to be somewhat apolitical in form. Let us examine the issue in more detail.

All the English versions accept that κελεύσας (part.aor.act) refers to αὐτοῦς (as Kouremenos claims “as is clear from what comes next, αὐτοῦς τοῦς πολλούς”[17]), and therefore all the rest is seen as an interpretation of the first verse of Orpheus’ alleged poem, ‘commanding the uninitiated to put doors on their ears, says [to the uninitiated], that he has not come to legislate for the many, but to teach those, who are pure of hearing’ or ‘commanding the uninitiated to put doors on their ears, says [to the initiated], that he has not come to legislate for the many, but to teach those who are pure of hearing’ or possibly even ‘commanding the uninitiated to put doors on their ears, says [to both the uninitiated and the initiated], that he has not come to legislate for the many, but to teach those who are pure of hearing’. Which of these interpretations seems the most likely? The mere
accuracy of the translation is not enough for verification of the text. It is essential, however, to look at the context i.e. the earlier versions. We will return to question when we come to the interpretation but before that, let us briefly analyse the Polish translation (based on the Janko-1 version).

The heart of the matter in the Polish version, on which the aforementioned difference is based compared to the English version, is the interpretation of αὐτοῦς as the accusative thus creating the form a.c.i. from both νομοθετεῖν, as well as from διδάσκειν. Consequently, θύρας ἐπίθεσθε would be interpreted by the commentator of the poem as Orpheus’ instructions to the initiated as to what it is they should be guided by, and not what his (Orpheus’) intentions in his instructions to his listeners are. Can the matter simply be resolved through linguistic preciseness? Probably not. Let us initially accept both versions and suggest several possible translations (of course other combinations may also be possible) based on two of the latest editions: Tsantsanoglou- Parássoglou and Janko-2 (also taking into consideration the above mentioned versions which reject the quote etc):

1. “he thus says, ordering them >> to put doors on their ears<< that he does not legislate for the many, but teaches those who are pure of hearing [pure in their hearing];”

2. “he thus says, ordering them >> to put doors on their ears<< that he does not legislate for the many, but teaches those who are pure of hearing [pure in their hearing];”

3. “he thus says, ordering them >> to put doors on their ears << that he does legislate some (τί) law or other for the many, but teaches those who are pure of hearing [pure in their hearing];”

4. “he thus says, ordering them >> to put doors on their ears >> that they should not in any way legislate for the many, but teach those who are pure of hearing [pure in their hearing];”

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17 Kouremenos, Commentary..., p. 174.
5. “he thus says, ordering them >> to put doors on their ears << that they should not in any way legislate for the many, but teach those who are pure of hearing [pure in their hearing].”

Before attempting to interpret this fragment, it is important to describe the wider context. The problems associated with the papyrus are obviously so extensive, that it is impossible to even mention all the various aspects in one article. I would however like to consider a very fundamental question, namely who the author of the commentary is – not necessarily his identity but at least a description of his intellectual profile. It is more about trying to establish the general character of the commentator. There are numerous hypotheses relating to the character of the commentary including suggestions of specific historical figures. I will not consider all of them here but merely indicate the most general tendencies based on selected examples.18

In The Orphic Poems, Martin West claims the following about the author of the commentary: ‘he is no humble servant of the poet, but a man with decided views of his own which it his primary purpose to expound. The Orphic text merely serves him as a prop. In interpreting it allegorically he licenses himself to find all kinds of meanings in it that it does not naturally bear. His interest in it is wholly philosophical, not philological’ 19 and then adds ‘he is aiming [...] to show that his own understanding of the world is already to be found in the most ancient poetry. It is not Orpheus that he wants to justify but his own theory’.20 West then indicates that the author could be defined as a member of the Ionic school of philosophy whose views are similar to those of Anaxagoras, Leukippos and Diogenes of Apollonia, ‘with this physical system author oddly combines a less rationalistic kind of concern with religious enlightenment’.21

19 West, The Orphic Poems, op. cit., p. 78.
20 Ibid., p. 80.
21 Ibid., p. 80–81. West also identifies the Ionic dialect (with some elements from the Attic dialect) as the language of the papyrus, ibid., p. 77. In his introduction to the 2006 edition, Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou writes: “it is difficult to decide between Attic with some Ionic features and Ionic with an Attic overlay”, K. Tsantsanoglou, Introduction, in: The Derveni Papyrus. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by Th. Kouremenos, G. M. Parássoglou, K. Tsantsanoglou, Firenze 2006, p. 11. We should add here that the first researcher who indicated the close link between the commentator of the papyrus and the philosophy of Anaxagoras and Diogenes was Walter Burkert. In his text from 1997 he claims ‘the writer appears as a
Richard Janko also admits that the commentary is typically philosophical. In his 2001 article, he claims that: ‘it was not this religious crisis but rather Tsanstanoglou’s excellent restorations of the opening columns that led me to conclude that the Derveni papyrus is the work, not of a seer (as Tsantsanoglou inclines to believe), but of a sophist, and among sophist not of Diogenes, but of Diagoras. We shall see that the career of Diagoras closely resembles the portrait of the author that West painted, that of someone who was familiar with the mysteries and with the Orphic poems, yet who gave them an interpretation based on Ionian physics and thus provoked the Athenians’ anger’.22 However, in his 2008 publication, he claims: ‘I need not repeat here my argument that the author need not have been a priest or diviner, but only a layperson like Chaerophon, [...]. The author of the Derveni papyrus was a φυσικός and, from traditional viewpoint, a blasphemer against the gods’.23

However, Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou views the matter differently. In his 1997 article dedicated to the first seven columns, he claims that: ‘it is also clear that the author’s general tendency is markedly didactic. But it is noticeable that this is not the didactic tendency of a theological thinker, but the desire of a religious practitioner to disseminate his professional secrets to the faithful’.24 He then points to the appropriate place in the papyrus text, on the basis of which the author of the commentary could be assigned various religious roles and claims ‘but all these activities could easily be classified under the general designation »mantis«’.25

In the debate between Janko and Tsantsanoglou regarding the religious profession of the commentator, Gabor Betegh adds his voice claiming: ‘I do not think Janko could demonstrate that Tsantsanoglou and others are mistaken in maintaining that the first

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23 Janko, Reconstructing (again) the Opening..., p. 51.
24 Tsantsanoglou, The First Columns..., p. 98.
columns of the papyrus present the author as a religious professional’, but he himself takes up a more general point of view, in which he states that ‘the most probable general characterisation of the author – especially in view of the first columns – is that he was a priestly figure with Orphic allegiance’. Furthermore, Betegh emphasizes the ethical aspect of the commentary which can be found in columns III-V.

Dirk Obbink takes a different view. He claims the following in his proposal: ‘I offer it as an alternative to the view of the Derveni papyrus as a composition of single dimension: a philological commentary, philosophical treatise, or literary paignion’. What is this interpretation based on? He says: ‘I suggest therefore that the Derveni author sees himself as answering in his treatise a potential criticism of Orphic teletai. [...] His elucidation of cosmology, in which eschatological myth associated with the mysteries is combined with a dominant concern about relations between elements (fire, air, earth, water, and their mixtures), is presented as at least potential instruction for mystic initiates, preferable to the teletai purveyed by many ritual craftsmen’.

Alberto Bernabé has a somewhat similar position and claims the following in his internet publication: ‘the commentator thus shares with Plato a moralizing tendency, as well as the notion that ritual elements are not the sole or fundamental factor in affecting the punishments one can expect in the afterlife. Such an idea, in fact, would in this conception be an offence against justice and ethics. The difference between the commentator and the Athenian philosopher lies in the fact that, whereas the former attempts to include a new moralized and philosophical vision in ritual practice, Plato goes a step further as he denies the ritual act any kind of value, instead developing a system in which the true \( \tau\varepsilon\lambda\varepsilon\tau\bar{\iota} \) is philosophy’.

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27 Ibid. p. 350.
28 Ibid. p. 89–91.
30 Ibid. p. 52–54.
As can be seen, the range of opinions is impressive (note that only a few have been selected from the available spectrum). Without a doubt, an analysis of the fragment of column VII which interests us, depends on what our view of the author’s character and his commentary is taken. Is it at least possible the minimize our preconceptions so that they do not overly colour or cloud our interpretation? My proposal below is initially based just such an approach. I will then consider a possible interpretation based on two external sources concerning the papyrus text - a fragment allegedly written by Heraclitus and Euripides’ Hippolytus (I will justify this choice in the appropriate place). Let us now move onto the analysis.

The fundamental assumption I accept at the outset, is the hypothesis presented by Theokritos Kouremenos. In the 2006 edition, he claims that in verses 10 and 11 of column VII: ‘there is no reason to assume that, for the Derveni author, the terms ὁί πολλοί, a probable rendering of Orpheus’ ὁί βεβηλοί, and ὁί τὴν ἀκοῆν ἄγνευοντες in 11 (if correctly supplemented) carry religious connotations’. Kouremenos directs the reader to his commentary to verses 7-8 in column XX, where he point to an analogy regarding religious traditions between the author of the commentary and Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato. He therefore concludes that, ‘the Derveni author addresses people who are intelligent and bent on understanding, just as he is able to withstand critical scrutiny and give a satisfying rational account to anyone demanding it’. If the expression ὁί πολλοί does not have a religious meaning, what else could it mean? Does it have a political connotation? Linking ὁί πολλοί with νομοθετεῖν definitely seems to support this idea. This, however, raises a serious issue. How is Orpheus’ teaching to be contrasted with law-giving? Why does the author of the commentary even pose this problem? I admit that this is totally unclear to me – I cannot answer this question at this point. I will therefore try a different approach. I submit that verses 9-11 in column VII have a political connotation and will check whether this leads to some feasible explanation. I will then return to the questions posed above.

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32 Kouremenos, Commentary..., p. 174.
34 Ibid. p. 241.
As noted previously, rejecting the giving of the law to the many (regardless of whether the issue relates to the essence of Orpheus’ teaching or the activities he advises his listeners to engage in) seems to be apolitical in nature. It certainly does not fit our knowledge and understanding of the Pre-Hellenistic era where being a citizen was the crowning of one’s humanity and a constitutive part of one’s personal fulfilment.\footnote{In Ancient Greece, no differentiation was made between the public/political domain and the private one. Every citizen polis, [...] was a public person working [...] for the good of society which was central to everything [...] all religious rituals were part of the public domain. It is not surprising therefore, that there is no word in Greek for the individual in our anti-social, truly anti-political sense [...]. Citizenship and practical ethics were manifested through political activity. It was contrasted with the life of the Cyclops who were not political, wild and barbaric”, D. Zygmuntowicz, Praktyka polityczna. Od „Państwa” do „Praw” Platona, Toruń 2011, s. 49–50.}

We have important evidence which indicates that - at least minimally - in the minds of the people of Hellas, there was a willingness to give up their participation in political life. Furthermore, this willingness was associated with Orpheus and his writings.

Contrasting the two fragments from Euripides tragedy – Theseus’ speeches and Hippolytus’ reply\footnote{Euripides, Hippolytus, 948–954, 1010–1020.} – introduces two corresponding issues: Hippolytus’ life is associated with the writings of Orpheus and an important aspect of this life is being ‘second in the polis’ (ἐν πόλει δεύτερος), which in the context of Hippolytus’ speech, means a life outside politics.\footnote{In another tragedy by Euripides, Antigone there is a similar situation in which Amphenol holds a similar view to that of Hippolytus. The argument with his brother Zethos, is paraphrased in Plato’s The Gorgias.} One could hypothesize that Hippolytus’ rejection of a life in politics is associated with a life of purity among friends who share his values. It is worth noting that Theseus refers to Hippolytus as ἀνήρ ξύνει (948-949), and accuses him of thinking that he is better than others, initiated and associating with the gods. Jokingly, one could claim that Hippolytus is in fact the one who does not want to legislate for the many, but to instruct only those who are pure of hearing. Little more can be said about Hippolytus himself concerning the issue which interests us. It is difficult to understand, who in fact both the οἱ πολλοὶ and the οἱ τὴν ἀ κοῆν ἁγνεύοντες are. It is also difficult to say unambiguously, what in fact the main idea of Orpheus’s writings is, which in turn, constitutes the foundation of Hippolytus’ life. Thanks to this however, we have a lead
which suggests that Orpheus’ followers are those who are better, more intelligent than the rest and whose intelligence keeps them away from politics (or at least it leads them to treat politics very cautiously). If we follow this line of reasoning it is hard not to see that it brings about associations with Heraclitus of Ephesus. Let us examine this issue more closely.

It is worth noting, that in the analyses of the Derveni papyrus, Heraclitus is a very prominent figure. Many researchers stress the importance of the “obscure philosopher’s” reflections in order to understand the intellectual context of the papyrus commentary. Let us consider the issue of Heraclitus in relation to column VII verses 9-11.

Let us begin with this extensive quote from Diogenes Laertios: He accused the Ephesians of expelling his friend Hermodorus from the town saying >> It would be best if the adult Ephesians were to hang themselves and left the town to the children (τοῖς ἁνήβοις) because they expelled Hermodorus, the best of men, with these words: “ Let no one be the best among us and if such were to be found, let him go elsewhere and be with others”<<.

When the Ephesians had asked him to establish the law for them, he refused because the town was being badly governed. He walked away towards the temple of Artemis, played with the children (μετὰ τῶν παιδίων) and played dice. When the Ephesians encircled him, he cried: >> Why are you so surprised, unworthy ones? Is it not better to play like this than to take part in your life of politics (μεθ’ ἵμων πολιτεύεσθαι- Π.Σ.)? <<.

Let us examine the above quote carefully. At the outset we see there are two important contrasts to be drawn:

38 Since the commentator mentions Heraclitus in column IV, the philosopher from Ephesus appears frequently in the analysis of the papyrus. Many authors indicate a certain analogy between the commentary and Heraclitus’ ideas in a wider context. It seems at first to be an exaggerated elitism, a criticism of traditional religion, the role of contrasts in understanding the structure of the cosmos, – Heraclitus’ ideas can be regarded as helpful in the analyses of the commentary. See e.g. A. Laks, Between Religion and Philosophy: the Function of Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus, “Phronesis” 1997, XLII/2, p. 125–127.

1. the adult citizens of Ephesus- the non-adults (οἱ ἄνηφοι, ὁ ἄνηφος – LSJ: “not yet come to man’s estate, opp. ἔφηβος, παις Heraclitus”), children (οἱ παιδες);
2. the adult citizens of Ephesus- the best (most useful among them being Hermodorus ὁ ὀνήστος ὁυήρ).

What is the basis of both these contrasts? Let us consider the background to the whole situation. It consists of the political-legal situation which is of most interest to us. Who was Hermodorus (Ἐρμόδωρος)? Apart from the information in the given written document, it is difficult to find any other information which is certain. This is liked to a very important figure in the history of the Roman legislature, also named Hermodorus, who had a great influence on the work of the committee of ten (decemviri legibus scribundis) and the law of the twelve tables written in 449 B.C. (lex duodecimo tabulorum). Is it possible that this is the same Hermodorus? The matter seems impossible to resolve as there are no sources.

If we agree, that this is the same person, the age difference between him and Heraclitus must have been great, maybe even one or two generations (unless Hermodorus lived for a very long time). Another unknown is the reason for the expulsion. Heraclitus describes it as, “the most useful” ὀνήστος – LSJ: “most useful, serviceable”), The context indicates that it was undoubtedly some kind of political-legal “usefulness” but no details are given.

Daniel W. Graham may be right when he says that: ‘the democratic practice of banishing

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40 Sextus Pomponius wrote about the role of Hermodorus in creating the law of the twelve tablets in De origine iuris, I, 2; Pliny the Elder in W Historii naturalnej (XXXIV, 11) mentions the statutes the Romans included in their legal system taken from the Ephesian legislature.

41 There are many different opinions on the matter e.g. G. B. Niebuhr wrote : „Statement of a philosopher’s ἄχρητη in Diogenes and writers of the same stamp are of so little weight, that the one which places the Ephesian philosopher about Ol. 69, need not prevent us from supposing that the Hermodorus of the decemvirs, thought sixty years after, was the same person”, G. B. Niebuhr, History of Rome, transl. J. Ch. Hare, C. Thirlwall, Philadelphia 1935, p. 231. H K. Mrówka in turn, who quotes Charles H. Kahn ’s rejection of such a possibility claims, „Assuming that Hermodorus was somewhat younger than Heraclitus, and the fact that a period of study must have preceded the writing of the Twelve Tables document, one cannot exclude the Hermodorus’ indirect influence on the formation of early Roman law.”, K. Mrówka, Heraklit. Fragmenty: nowy przekład i komentarz, Warszawa 2004, s. 327. Daniel W. Graham, formulates yet another hypothesis claiming: „the Twelve Tables Hermodorus interpreted were published in 449, too late to be connected with Heraclitus’ acquaintance; the later Hermodorus could be a grandson, since it was common to name boys after their grandfathers”, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: the Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, ed. & transl. D. W. Graham, Cambridge 2010, vol. I, p. 194.
outstanding men (for fear that they might stage a coup d'état) leaves only the incompetent rabble\(^4\).\(^{42}\)

Hermodorus’ activities aside, Heraclites refuses to work on legislation for Ephesus claiming that political matters in Ephesus are in a terrible state and a good example of this is the expulsion of his friend. The decision makers are “incompetent rabble” – the so-called \(\ddot{\text{t}}{\text{i} \ \text{p} \text{o} \text{l} \lambda \text{o} \ddot{\text{i}}\). Heraclitus will not legislate for them, neither will he participate or help in creating the law. He suggests that power be given to the children and cities and “acts politically” by playing a game of dice with them. Why is power to be given to the children and what is Heraclitus trying to show? It seems that the adults, namely the \(\ddot{\text{t}}{\text{i} \ \text{p} \text{o} \text{l} \lambda \text{o} \ddot{\text{i}}\), are those who are no longer being brought up, (paideia). They have already had their upbringing and Heraclitus is clearly on the receiving end of this (and Hermodorus is even more so). The last remaining hope is in those who are still being brought up. They are still open to wisdom they are still pure of hearing. So Heraclitus prefers to play with/teach them and not waste time on the “political” activity of the ‘incompetent Ephesian rabble’.

What links the children and Hermodorus? He is” the most useful”- unlike the \(\ddot{\text{t}}{\text{i} \ \text{p} \text{o} \text{l} \lambda \text{o} \ddot{\text{i}}\), he has had a proper upbringing-paideia. Children, in turn, unlike the \(\ddot{\text{t}}{\text{i} \ \text{p} \text{o} \text{l} \lambda \text{o} \ddot{\text{i}}\), have not undergone an improper upbringing (paideia) and are therefore still open to a proper one.

Let us hypothesize that “pure of hearing” can be understood in three ways where one meaning does not exclude any of the others but forms a kind of spectrum. The first, as represented by Hermodorus, is the hearing of a well brought up person- that is “pure of hearing “ is in actu. The second meaning refers to those who have been “cleansed”- which is analogous to those who have been subjected to the Socrates method –those elements which “sullied the hearing” have been removed – in other words this is “ pure hearing” which has been prepared by removing unnecessary elements and forms the basis of a good upbringing (paideia; this “pre hearing” is in potentio post emendandum /post

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\(^{42}\) The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy..., p. 194. K. Mrówka, views this in a similar way, see. K. Mrówka, Heraklit..., s. 327–328. John Burnet, has a different opinion and views the expulsion of Hermodorus as anti-Persian activity: “Zeller held, […] that the expulsion of Hermodorus, could not have taken place before the downfall of Persian rule […] but there is no difficulty that the Ephesians may have sent one of their citizens into banishment when they were still paying tribute to the Great King. […] His expulsion would mark the beginnings of the movement against Persian rule, rather than its successful issue”, J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 3rd ed., London 1920, p. 96–97.
purificationem. The third meaning refers to hearing in its purest form (in potentio) which is not the result of upbringing or “cleansing” (purification). In the analysed fragment from Heraclitus, Hermodorus represents the first meaning, the children represent the third meaning but the second appears to be missing. Why is this the case? One can only assume that the democratic system of government is not the best place for paideia – to simplify matters, its basis is an assumption of individual epistemic egalitarianism. It is not possible to teach adult citizens and it is they who could potentially represent the second meaning of “pure of hearing”.

The question arises- what really is the basis of a proper upbringing (paideia)? The answer can be found, among other places in the fourth column of the Derveni papyrus (verses 5-6) where the quote from Heraclitus’ poem is quoted (B3, B94). There we read that ‘according to this Heraclitus, his belief that collective things are great, undermines the importance of individual ones”. How can one understand assigning greatness to collective things? The reader is directed straight to fragment B2, which says: “the common is collective”. Although logos is common, many people live as if they reasoned individually “(ξυνὸς γὰρ κοινός, τοῦ λόγου δ’εόντος ξυνοῦ ζώοισιν οἱ πολλοί ὡς ἱδίαιν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν). This idea can be developed further and in the political-legal context of fragment B14 we read:” those who speak wisely should depend on what is common to all, such as polis is for the law and even more so. All human laws are maintained by one divine law; it governs how it wants, is sufficient for all and is above all laws. If we also take into consideration fragment B44 (μάχεσθαι χρή τοῦ δῆμου ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὑπὲρ τοῦ γιουμένου ὄκωσπερ τείχεος), it then becomes obvious that Heraclitus does not reject making laws as such. On the contrary, this aspect of practical wisdom can be seen to be of particular importance. However, creating laws requires the necessary foundations which can be seen from two points of view. The first is research into κοινὸς λόγος: a philosopher is the only one who can formulate it. The second aspect concerns those for whom the law is created: the δῆμος who should have the right upbringing directing them

43 K. Kulig, Papirus z Derveni (przekład), op. cit., s. 7.
44 ξύν νόσοι λέγοντες ἵσχυρεβαί χρή τοῦ ξυνοῦ πάντων, ὄκωσπερ νόμοι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἵσχυροτέρος, τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώποι νόμοι ὑπὸ εὐός τοῦ θείου κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ εξαρκεῖ πάσι καὶ περιγίνεται [πάντων].
The problem can be formulated as follows: the right *paideia* (based on *koinóς λόγος*) must come “before” the creation of laws. Otherwise, the law will only be a dead letter or if the law is created on the basis of bad *paideia*, then it becomes anarchy. 45

Let us move on to the conclusion. It is worth stressing, that it is basically not possible to formulate unambiguous conclusions regarding the text, as its reconstruction is still an open matter, the subject of lively debate and one in which we can always expect new, maybe even surprising, discoveries and interpretations.

It is difficult to unambiguously solve the context in which the commentator of the Derveni papyrus moves: is it a strictly religious context, a political one, a politico-religious one or a philosophical one? We could succumb to a more general interpretation that draws all of these strands together. We could show criticism which is intellectually fossilized, dogmatic, orthodox, uncritical, and shallow and shows a superficial understanding of both reality and the text (religious and philosophical).

A similar situation occurs with those being addressed by Orpheus’ message. It is impossible to solve the problem of whether the commentator is addressing only who are

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45 This raises the question of the relationship between two categories: ο δήμος and οι πολλοί. Are these synonyms? Probably not. K. Mrówka’s comments sound convincing when he claims: „The law is a symbol of freedom, not coercion. The only lack of freedom is ignorance, in this case, not knowing the basic rationale of the Law-Logos. The law is like a defensive wall which surrounds and protects the city from the enemy. If the encircling wall πόλις acts as a protection from the external enemy, then the νόμος, «the law», is the wall which protects δήμος, «the people» from the external enemy, the πολλοί”. K. Mrówka, *Heraklit. Fragmenty*,... s. 143. Who then are the οι πολλοί? Dorota Zygmuntowicz indicates a similar problem very well in her excellent work on Plato’s political philosophy. In it she claims „[...] Socrates [...] leaves no doubt as to who the worse are [πολλοί – P. Š.], they are those who [...] create fear and in this way force them to take power. [...] It is not the crowd [δήμος – P. Š.], part of which is the covetous polis (431c), unfairly stripped of its rights. [...] We need to admit, that the group who instill fear in philosophy, are those who readily aspire to ruling the crowds but are unable «to turn their minds to what exists» and «to associate with the divine and orderly». In addition, «the people can never be happy unless, those who are directed by the divine, point this out to them» (500e2-e4)”, D. Zygmuntowicz, *Praktyka polityczna. Od „Państwa” do „Praw” Platona*, Toruń 2011, s. 177–178. It needs to be stressed that the whole part entitled Protretyczna funkcja Kallipolis (VI, 498a–505e), s. 174–187, which indicates among other things, the meaning and understanding of „cleansing” (in the context of the Socratic method) in *paideia* and legislation, almost ideally illustrates the matters being considered here. As an aside, let us add that similar convictions on the antiquity of customs in relation to the law, and consequently upbringing in relation to legislation, can also be found in *De Republica emendanda* A. Frycz-Modrzewski..
interested in being initiated in the rituals, or is the message also addressed to all those who are open to philosophical (quasi-philosophical) reflection. Personally, I am in favour of the interpretation which sees the “pure of hearing” not only as those “initiated” in the rituals but in a wider context which is more philosophical, political and legal than religious.

The philosophical, political, legal context is an unlikely interpretation which would result in the formula οὐ τι νομοθέτειν having an apolitical meaning. I think the Pythagorean-Platonic notion of “the true art of politics” so concisely presented by Plato in *The Gorgias* (521d6-522a7) or Heraclitus’ philosophical-legal concept briefly analyzed above, can be referred to here. It is also possible to analyse the attitudes of Hippolytus and Amphionus from the Euripedian tragedy, from the same perspective. Furthermore, if we agree with Aristotle’s’ approach, that ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικὸν ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a 37–39), it seems that the meaning of justice in Orphic reflection, and the highlighted role justice plays in the Derveni papyrus, allows us to hypothesize that the observation and identification of injustice in poleis had a great influence on the formation of philosophical and philosophical-religious reflection, which the text of the Derveni papyrus is an undoubtedly important example.

The table below compares fragments from Heraclitus’ writings with those from the Derveni papyrus (columns XX and XXII after Tsantsanoglou-Parassoglou; IV, V and VII after Janko-2). I will not suggest that the commentary from the papyrus is “Heraclitean”. However, I believe that “the spirit of Heraclitus’ philosophy” can help with the interpretation and be inspiring. I admit that the basis for the comparisons is fairly subjective. It is meant to be an objective record of the relation between the reflections of the “obscure” philosopher and the commentator’s text. In the author’s opinion, it allows for certain analogies to be found (not all of them) which could be researched further.

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<th>Problem</th>
<th>Derveni Papyrus</th>
<th>Heraclitus from Ephesus</th>
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<th>Knowledge which is the foundation of paideia and legislation: this corresponds with the way the poleis are ruled by the “sleeping ones”</th>
<th>IV, 5–6: 5. κατὰ [ταύτ]α Ἡράκλειτος, μα[τρύμενος] τὰ κοινὰ, 6. κα[(αστρέφε]τ}φει τὰ ἱδ[ι]α...&lt;br&gt;XXII, 4–6: 4. κρατιστεύοντες λέγουσι δὲ τι ἂν αὐτῶν ἐκάστωπ 5. ἐπὶ θυμὸν ἠλήθη, ἀπερ ἂν θέλοντες τυγχάνωσι, 6. οὐδαμά ταύτα, ὑπὸ πλεονεξίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπ’ ἀμάθιας.</th>
<th>B2: ξυνὸς γὰρ κοινὸς τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐκόντος ξυνὸ ξύσωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδιαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.&lt;br&gt;B89: τοῖς ἐγηρηγοροῦσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ καμιαμένων ἐκαστὸν εἰς ἰδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι.</th>
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προανηλώσθαι, ἄλλα

10. καὶ τῆς γνώμης στερούμενοι πρὸς ἀπέρχονται.
11. πρὶν μὲν τὰ [ἱ]ερὰ ἐπιτελέσαι ἐλπίζοντες ἐλθῆσειν.

Legislation, 

polis, paideia


B121: ἀξίον Ἐφεσίωις ἡμεῖς ἀπαγόρευσαί τίς καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβας τήν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν...

DL IX, 2, 9–3, 4: ἀξιόμενος δὲ καὶ νόμος θεῖας πρὸς αὐτῶν ὑπερεῖ διὰ τὸ ἡδή κεκρατήσας τῇ ποιητῇ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πόλιν. ἀναχωρήσας δὲ εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος μετὰ τῶν παιδῶν ἡστραγαλίζει: περιστάντων δ’ αὐτῶν τῶν Ἐφεσίων, τί, ὥς κάκισται, θεασάμεθα·, εἰπεν ἢ σοι κρείττων τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἢ μεθ’ ἴμων πολιτεύοσθαι;

Transl. P. Olearnik